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Case No. 20140434-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
LANE D. BIRD, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution entered following a 
conviction for securities fraud, a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Lane D. Bird was convicted of securities fraud for, in 
connection with the sale or offer of a security, willfully making numerous 
false statements, omitting numerous material facts, and engaging in an act, 
practice, or course of business that operated as a fraud on his victitns. His 
victims, Bill and Susan Markham, were Defendant's next-door neighbors. 
The Markhams invested $247,000 in a hand-lotion company Defendant was 
promoting. Defendant did not disclose his prior bankruptcies, tax liens, and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
other civil judgments, nor did he disclose the financial disarray that the 
hand-lotion venture was in. Defendant told the1n that he had invested half 
a million of his own money in the venture, but he had not. Defendant also 
told them that the money would be used to update and automate the 
production equipment. But while some of the victims' money was used for 
that purpose, most was not. 
In exchange for the investment, Bill Markham was promised stock 
and a position with the company. The original founder of the company 
ousted Defendant after just a few months, but Bill stayed on for another two 
years, working with the founder in a futile attempt to make the venture 
profitable. Mired in debt and lacking in sales, the company never made a 
profit. Bill shut the company down after the Food & Drug Administration 
(FDA) seized and destroyed the company's product inventory because it 
contained harmful bacteria. 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to prison but suspended the 
prison term and ordered Defendant to pay $164,723.17 in restitution. In 
calculating restitution, the trial court subtracted $82,276.83 from the victims' 
initial investment of $247,000 to account for the value of fixed assets that Bill 
had assumed control of after Defendant was no longer involved in the 
venture. But the trial court declined to adjust the figure to account for the 
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product inventory that Defendant had relinquished to Bill, explaining that 
the product inventory was worthless because the FDA confiscated it. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to offset the 
amount of restitution to account for product inventory from which the 
victims never received any benefit? 
Standard of Review. While the trial court's interpretation of the 
relevant restitution statutes is reviewed for correctness, its application of 
those statutes in ordering restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, il 5, 353 P.3d 179; State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 
5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "A h·ial court will be dee1ned to have abused its 
discretion only if no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by 
the trial court." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, il 5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that 
Defendant caused the victims' loss? 
Standard of Review. Review is for clear error. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 192-93 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
-3-
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• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1 (West 2012) 
• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-3 (West 2012) 
• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-21 (West 2012) 
• Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22 (West 2012) 
• Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (West 2015) 
• Utah Code Aim. §77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2015) 
• Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301 (West 2004) 
G Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2015). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves Defendant's challenge to the amount of restitution 
he was ordered to pay his victims. Defendant was charged with theft and 
securities fraud. Rl-2. He was tried before the court and acquitted of theft 
but convicted of securities fraud. R121-22. As part of Defendant's sentence, 
the court ordered him to pay $164,723.17 in restitution. R121-22; *157; 231. 1 
A. Summary off acts. 2 
By January 2007, Bill and Susan had lived next door to Defendant for 
about six years. R346:21. They enjoyed a "very friendly relationship," 
going to dinner together occasionally, interacting through church, and 
talking about each other's jobs when they crossed paths. R346:21-23. Based 
1 After page 178 in the record, the numbering mistakenly reverts to 
149. To avoid confusion, any citation to the second occurrence of pages 
149-78 will be preceded by an asterisk. 
2 Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the verdict, the facts are presented in a manner 
consistent with that verdict. Conflicting evidence is addressed only to the 
extent necessary to understand the issues on appeal. 
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on these interactions and Bill's observation of Defendant's lifestyle, Bill 
viewed Defendant as a successful entrepreneur. R346:23-26. Bill and Susan 
trusted Defendant. R346:111; 137. 
Around January or February 2007, Defendant approached Bill about 
investing in a venture Defendant was involved in. R346:26-27. The venture 
involved producing and distributing a hand lotion that, when dried, formed 
a barrier to protect hands from acid, dirt, and grease. R346:26-27, 40-41. A 
man named Omar Bonada had developed the lotion and was trying to 
produce and distribute it and had brought in Defendant to help with 
distribution and sales. R346:32; 347:369, 390-91. Defendant told Bill that the 
venture had been experiencing "exponential growth," and that they were 
looking for $250,000 in capital to update and automate the "antiquated" 
production equipment so they could keep pace with de1nand. R346:26-27, 
30, 61-62. 
Defendant and Omar entered an agreement where Omar's company, 
ClarconLab, LLC, was dissolved and two new companies were formed: one 
to handle production-Clarcon Labs, Inc. - and another to handle 
dish·ibution and marketing-Clarcon Distributing Inc. R346:85; 347:390-91. 
Defendant told Bill that he was part owner of Clarcon Labs and full owner 
of Clarcon Distributing. R343:21-22; 346:34. Defendant showed Bill a 
-5-
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prospectus he had developed, projecting over $15.4 million in profits for the 
first year; a copy of several invoices, showing sales that had been made by 
Omar's company over the past few months; and some checks, ostensibly 
indicating payment on some of the invoices. R343:62-63; 346:48, 50; SEl, 2. 
Defendant also told Bill that it was a "solid" investment. R346:45. In 
fact, he told Bill and Susan that he believed the product would be so 
successful that he had put everything he had into the venture, investing 
$500,000 of his own money by taking out a second mortgage on his house 
and borrowing from his father. R343:28; 346:44-45, 125-26. Defendant also 
gave Bill a tour of the factory, introduced hiln to 01nar, and later showed 
Bill a stockpile of inventory that Omar had given Defendant as "security" 
for any investments that Defendant brought in. R343:17; 346:41-43. 
Bill and Susan agreed to invest with the understanding that their 
money would be used for updating and automating the production 
equipment. R343:34; 346:61-62, 73, 97, 122, 124. To come up with the 
money, Bill and Susan took out a second mortgage on their home, Susan 
liquidated her retirement account, and Bill borrowed $50,000 from his aunt. 
R343:45; 346:52-53, 74-76. In six separate payments between March 7, 2007, 
and May 16, 2007, Bill and Susan gave a total of $247,000 to Clarcon Labs 
and Clarcon Distributing. SE6. 
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After most of that amount had been invested, Defendant and Bill 
signed an agreement on April 11, 2007, memorializing the arrangement. 
SES. In exchange for the investment, Bill would become the Executive Vice 
President of Clarcon Distributing and would oversee marketing and sales. 
R346:64; SES. He would receive a salary once the company became 
profitable, plus a commission on subordinates' sales. R346:64; 347:432; SES. 
He would be given a 5% share of stock in Clarcon Labs and a 25% share of 
stock in Clarcon Distributing. R346:109-10; SES. Bill would also become 
Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of Clarcon Labs, but with no 
significant role in that company. R346:73; SES. Defendant represented that 
he presently owned stock in the two companies and had the right to assign 
it. SES. 
In fact, the companies had never issued any stock because, as 
Defendant later acknowledged, there was no value in the companies at that 
point. R343:103; R347:458, 482. Defendant had registered the companies 
just days before Bill signed the agreement, even listing Bill as an officer of 
Clarcon Distributing without his knowledge. R343:21, 32; 346:85-86; SE14, 
15. 
Over several formal and informal pre-investment conversations with 
the Markhams, Defendant never told them about his two prior 
-7-
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bankruptcies. R346:109, 131; SE41, 42. Nor did he tell them about several 
civil judgments and tax liens against him. R346:109, 131; SE23-33, 35. 
Regarding the Clarcon venture, Defendant never gave the Markhams any 
audited financial statements or other documents that showed the venture' s 
assets and liabilities. R343:39; 346:49, 127. Defendant never discussed any 
of ClarconLab' s debts, nor did he tell the Markhams that ClarconLab was 
borrowing money from other companies in which Defendant was a 
principal to meet operating expenses and pay salaries. R343:27-28; 346:99, 
106. Defendant later characterized the financial and managerial state of 
ClarconLab- and, indeed, everything about the venture- as "a mess" and 
said that he had intended to use the inveshnent "'to help Omar out of a ... 
bad situation."' R347:382, 434-38, 462. But Defendant did not convey that 
to the Markhams. R346:45, 122, 128, 150; 347:434. 
Defendant used Bill and Susan's money to buy some new production 
equipment, but he spent much of it to cover salaries and bills and to repay 
over $68,000 that Defendant had borrowed from another one of his 
ventures, Powerslide Tools, Inc. R343:93; 346:129, 190, 196; SE9. In fact, for 
nearly the first two months of each company's existence, the operating 
accounts for both Clarcon Labs and Clarcon Distributing consisted almost 
solely of the funds Defendant received from the Markhams. R346:l 77-87; 
-8-
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SE7 at 1-4 (Clarcon Dish~ibuting check register listing $127.50 in deposits 
from sources other than the Markhams between March 8, 2007, and May 1, 
2007, compared with $170,300 in deposits from the Markhams); SES at 1-10 
(Clarcon Labs check register listing $970.66 in deposits from sources other 
than the Markhams between March 27, 2007, and June 4, 2007, compared 
with $127,000 in deposits from the Markhams). Defendant thus used the 
Markhams' money to cover all operating expenses during that time period 
and beyond. R346:128, 177-87; SE7 at 1-4; SE8 at 1-8. see also R346:197-98 
( describing first-in, first-out rule of forensic accounting, whereby expenses 
are not attributed to new deposits until preexisting funds- here, the 
Markhams' investment- are exhausted). 
Bill began working part time at Clarcon Distributing in April 2007. 
R346:88-89. He started to review the books for Clarcon Lab and Clarcon 
Distributing. R346:94-95. In May 2007, about a week after he had given his 
last check to Defendant, Bill noticed large payments to Powerslide and 
asked Defendant about it. R346:89-90, 92-95. Defendant explained that he 
was part owner of Powerslide and had used Powerslide to pay some of the 
operating expenses for the Clarcon venture and, given his ownership 
interest in each company, Defendant said "he had the right to pass the 
monies back and forth as he saw fit." R346:99, 105-06, 148-49. 
-9-
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Bill also noticed that while Clarcon Labs was updating some 
equipment, it was not doing so as quickly as he had wanted. R346:89-90. 
Although Defendant had told Bill not to talk to Omar about finances or 
other business matters-Omar and Defendant supposedly had an 
agreement that Defendant would be the point of contact for all investors-
Bill approached Omar sometime in late May about his concerns. R346:89, 
99-103. In the course of that conversation, Bill mentioned Defendant's 
personal investment of half a million dollars in the company, and Omar 
became angry. R346:100. The two confronted Defendant, and Defendant 
acknowledged that he had not put any money into the company, but 
reasoned that he had put that much into the company "in the form of his 
time and efforts." R346:102-03. 
On June 1, 2007, Omar ousted Defendant from Clarcon Labs. 
R346:103-04; DEll. Defendant initially tried to continue working with 
Clarcon Distributing- based out of his personal office-but the relationship 
with Bill had soured and Defendant soon relinquished any control over 
Clarcon Dish·ibuting. R343:97; 347:422, 424, 471. In July 2007, Bill and 
Susan met with Defendant at his office. Defendant admitted that he had 
lied about investing his own money in the venture, apologized, and said 
that he had done it because he thought the Markhams would not invest if 
-10-
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they did not think he had "smne skin in the game." 346:106-07, 130, 158. 
Defendant gave Bill the inventory he had been holding in his office as 
security, which was valued at $500,000 retail. R346:125, 156; 347:346, 379, 
426. 3 
Defendant dissolved Clarcon Distributing; Omar dissolved Clarcon 
Labs; and on June 8, 2007, Bill and Omar formed Clarcon Biological 
Chemistry Laboratory, Inc. SE14, 15, 16. For the next two years, the two 
tried to salvage the company but were never able to produce and market 
the product like they had hoped. R343:61, 114; 347:107. Bill began looking 
at all the records from the various c01npanies- some of which he had not 
seen before Defendant left, R343:74-75, 94-98-and realized that the 
financial condition of the venture as of June 2007 was "[p]retty bad": "Lot of 
debt. Lot of overhead. Virtually nothing in sales." R346:78, 107. As one 
salesman described it, other than a few small transactions, most sales were 
"preliminary." R347:353. And that financial picture did not improve over 
3 Bill estimated the retail value of the inventory when it was first 
shown to him as $1.5-$2 million, based on the prices Defendant had quoted 
him when Bill was considering whether to invest. R343:29-30. But 
everyone else, including Defendant, valued the inventory at $500,000. 
R346:125, 156 (Susan); 347:346 (a salesman); 347:379 (Defendant). 
-11-
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the next two years. Many promising distributors had simply signed letters 
of interest that never materialized into actual sales. R343:89, 110, 121-22. 
In 2009, Bill and Omar began the process for FDA approval in an 
effort to convince reluctant distributors to purchase the product. R343:111. 
The FDA conducted site inspections in April and May 2009 and informed 
the company of several necessary procedural safeguards. R156-60; 343:111. 
But when the FDA tested the lotion, it found harmful bacteria in it and in 
June 2009 ordered the company to recall and destroy the product. R153-55; 
343:111-12. Unsatisfied with the company's efforts to do so, the FDA had 
U.S. Marshals seize the remaining inventory on July 31, 2009. R153-55; 
343:112-13. Bill and Omar then dissolved the company. 343:110-11; SE16. 
At no point did any of the four Clarcon companies make a profit-
either before Bill invested, while he worked with Defendant, or after 
Defendant left. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:382, 417, 432, 467-68, 476, 482. 
What sales they did have were never enough to cover operating expense 
and payments on debt. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:417, 431-32. Other 
than one check for $1,129.67, Bill never received any salary or commissions 
while Defendant was involved in the venture. R346:78; SES at 7. "Sales 
apparently were not there, and there [were] no commissions to be paid." 
R346:78. Hoping to make their initial $247,000 investment bear fruit, Bill 
-12-
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and Susan put an additional $193,000 into the venture after Defendant left, 
bringing their total cash investment to $440,000. R346:108. Bill worked 60 
to 80 hours per week in the mortgage industry to pay bills and to 
"subsidize" the Clarcon venture. R346:108. By 2012, the Markhams were on 
the verge of having to sell their house because they could not make 
payments on the second mortgage. R346:108, 137-38. As Bill described the 
situation, "It's like being 18 years old all over again and having to start over 
financially." R346: 108-09. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with one count of theft and one count of 
securities fraud, both second degree felonies. Rl-2. A bench trial was held 
August 28 and 29, 2012. R84-87. 
The Markhams testified for the State in a manner consistent with the 
facts discussed above. The State also presented testimony from an 
investigator with the Utah Division of Securities and an expert on securities 
law. R346:18, 114, 164; 347:235, 240. Defendant called his sister-who had 
worked at Clarcon Distributing as a bookkeeper while Defendant was 
involved with the company-and a salesman who had also worked with 
Clarcon Distributing during that time. R347:294-95, 331, 333-34. Defendant 
also took the stand and disputed almost every aspect of the Markhams' 
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testimony. See, e.g., R347:386-87, 392, 410, 413, 425-26, 469, 471. Defendant 
did not, however, dispute that the Clarcon venture was "a mess," mired in 
debt, and unprofitable. 347:382, 417,432, 434-38, 476,482. 
The court acquitted Defendant of the theft charge but found him 
guilty of securities fraud. R87. It sentenced him to one to fifteen years in 
prison and fined him $10,000, but suspended the sentence and fine and 
placed him on probation and ordered hhn to serve 180 days in jail. R121-22. 
The Markhams had submitted a letter, asking the court not to send 
Defendant to prison but to order him to pay restitution. R118. The court 
scheduled a restitution hearing for a later date. R122. 
The State filed a restitution request for $247,000- the amount of the 
Markhams' initial inveshnent in the venture. R134-35. The State argued 
that the Markhams had relied on Defendant's statements in making the 
investment, were never given stock in the company as promised, were 
never repaid the $247,000, and never received any return on their 
investment. R135-36. In support, the State referred to the trial testimony 
and attached copies of the checks the Markhams had used to pay 
Defendant. R135, 139-45. 
Defendant objected to the State's request. R148-50. He argued that 
the Markhams had "not suffered an actual loss in this case." R148. 
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Defendant asserted that because Bill became involved in the company and 
Defendant had turned over assets and inventory worth between $1 million 
and $1.5 million, the Markhams had not actually lost anything. R149. 
Defendant relied on the trial record, a number of attachments identifying 
the inventory he had returned to Bill, and the FDA's report following its site 
inspection. R149-50, 152-78. 
The parties waived their right to a hearing on restitution, and the trial 
court decided the issue based on the record before it, which included the 
case file. R*153. The trial court concluded that the Markhams did not 
receive any return on their $247,000 investment. R*155. It found that the 
only thing of value the Markhams received in exchange for their investment 
was $82,276.83 worth of fixed assets Bill had retained when he assumed 
control of the Clarcon venture.4 R*155. The court thus offset the $247,000 
loss by $82,276.83. R*155. But the court declined to further offset the loss 
based on the value of the product inventory because the government had 
seized it. R*156. Finally, the court concluded that Defendant's conduct was 
the but-for cause of the Markhams' loss, and that the loss had "a sufficient 
causal nexus in fact and time with Defendant's securities fraud." R*155. 
4 The fixed assets included labelers, drill presses, processing 
machinery, raw ingredients, a greenhouse, a desk, computers, office 
equipment, and lab equipment. R*155. 
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The court thus ordered complete and court-ordered restitution of 
$164,723.17. R*156. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was 
denied, and he timely appealed the underlying restitution order. R267, 285. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I. In challenging the restitution order, Defendant argues that 
the Markhams did not actually suffer any loss because Defendant gave Bill 
product inventory that exceeded the value of the Markhams' investment. 
Defendant argues that the restitution order thus should have been offset by 
the value of that inventory, resulting in no restitution. Defendant also 
argues that he did not cause the Markhams' loss because he was convicted 
only of selling securities without a license, which could not be the but-for 
cause of the Markhams' loss. Furthermore, Defendant argues that any 
causal nexus is too attenuated because the Markhams' loss occurred in 2009, 
as a result of Bill's failure to follow FDA regulations-long after Defendant 
was no longer involved in the venture. 
The inventory the Markhams received did not reduce the losses they 
incurred because the inventory was not sufficiently valuable to cover the 
venture' s operating expenses and debt. The Markhams received no profit 
from their investment; indeed, they did not even recover the principal they 
invested. 
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Moreover, the record clearly establishes that Defendant was charged 
with, convicted of, and sentenced for securities fraud, not selling securities 
without a license. And Defendant's many fraudulent state1nents, omissions, 
and other actions are the but-for cause of the Markhams' loss; without 
Defendant's fraudulent actions, the Markhams would not have invested 
their money in a failed venture. 
Furthermore, the causal nexus between Defendant's fraudulent 
actions and the Markhams' loss is not attenuated either factually or 
temporally. Attenuation occurs when the loss is attributable to some 
intervening cause that is not reasonably foreseeable. But the Markhams' 
loss occurred in 2007 - a direct result of Defendant's fraudulent actions -
when they invested their money in a failed venture. Bill's efforts over the 
next two years were nothing more than a futile attempt to salvage that 
investment. And the FDA's seizure of the property and Bill's dissolution of 
the company merely marked the end of that futile two-year attempt to 
recoup his lost inveshnent. In any event, given the financial disarray of the 
venture, the ultimate failure of the venture was reasonably foreseeable at 
the time of Defendant's fraud. 
Issue II. Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the trial court's conclusion that he caused the Markhams' loss. But the 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence demonstrates that any sales were insufficient to generate a profit 
given the venture's debts and operating expenses. The undisputed 
evidence at trial was that no Clarcon entity ever made a profit. The 
evidence thus supports the trial court's finding that Defendant caused the 
Markhams' loss when he convinced them to invest in a failed venture by 
willfully misstating and omitting material facts. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges only the restitution order entered against him. 
He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction or any other aspect of his conviction or sentence. And his 
challenge to the restitution order is based only on whether the Markhams 
suffered any loss, whether Defendant is responsible for any loss they did 
suffer, and whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's 
conclusion that the security the Markhams received for their investment 
was worthless. 
The record is clear that the Markhams suffered a loss of well over 
$164,000-the amount Defendant was ordered to pay. Defendant-and not 
Bill, the FDA, or anyone else-caused that loss. The security the Markhams 
received for their investment was Bill's equity position in the venture. And 
the evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that that security was 
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worthless, not just when the FDA confiscated the company's inventory, 
but-accounting for the company's liabilities-when Defendant gave the 
inventory to Bill. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT CREDITED DEFENDANT 
FOR THE VALUE OF FIXED ASSETS THE VICTIMS 
ACQUIRED, BUT REFUSED TO CREDIT HIM FOR 
PRODUCT INVENTORY FROM WHICH THE VICTIMS 
RECEIVED NO BENEFIT. 
Defendant argues that restitution is inappropriate for three reasons: 
(1) the Markhams did not suffer any loss because Defendant gave them 
product inventory that exceeded the value of their investment; (2) 
Defendant was convicted only of, or has accepted responsibility only for, 
selling a security without a license, and that conduct was not the but-for 
cause of any loss suffered by the Markhams; and (3) because Defendant was 
not involved in the Clarcon venture when the FDA seized the inventory, 
any loss was too attenuated from Defendant's actions. 
Defendant's arguments are foreclosed by the record. First, the 
inventory was insufficient to cover the value of the Markhams' investment 
because the company was mired in debt, lacking in sales, and peddling an 
unsafe product that the FDA eventually confiscated. Second, Defendant 
was convicted of securities fraud for engaging in an act, practice, or course 
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of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon the Markhams, and for 
making numerous material misstate1nents and 01nissions to induce the 
Markhams to invest. That fraudulent activity was the but-for cause of the 
Markhams putting their money into a failed investment and not receiving 
any benefit in return. Third, the Markhams' loss is not too attenuated from 
Defendant's conduct because the Clarcon venture was a failed venture from 
the beginning. Aside from a single thousand-dollar check, the Markhams 
never recouped any of their principal despite Bill's prolonged efforts to 
salvage the investment. That Bill was ultimately unsuccessful at doing so 
does not break the causal chain. 
Restitution serves compensatory, deterrent, and rehabilitative 
purposes. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,I18, 214 P.3d 104. Chief among 
those purposes is "making crime victims whole for the harms they suffer 
because of a defendant's criminal conduct." State v. Wadsworth, 2015 UT 
App 138, ~13, 351 P.3d 826 (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. granted, 
363 P.3d 523. Thus, "[t]he appropriate measure of the loss or damage to a 
victim is fact-sensitive and will vary based on the facts of a particular case." 
State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,I15, 82 P.3d 211. Trial courts are therefore 
"granted flexibility in determining damages in order to 'fashion an 
equitable award to the victim."' Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, if13 (quoting 
-20-
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Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ifl4); see also Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 
465, 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("[R]ules relating to the measure of damages 
are flexible, and can be modified in the interest of fairness." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
The h·ial court properly exercised that flexibility when it decided to 
credit Defendant for fixed assets turned over to Bill, but declined to credit 
Defendant for inventory that was insufficient to cover Bill's liabilities and 
ultimately deemed worthless. 
A. The victims suffered a loss of over $164,000, even 
accounting for the value of the inventory Defendant 
returned. 
Defendant argues that as a matter of law, any property returned to 
the Markhams must be used to offset the amount of their loss. Aplt. Br. at 
28-32. Defendant thus argues that the Markhams were compensated when 
Defendant gave Bill the product inventory Defendant had been holding as 
security. Aplt. Br. at 23, 25. In other words, Defendant challenges whether 
the Markhams in fact suffered any loss. 
The State agrees that the value of any loss should be offset by the 
value of any income the Markhams received from their investment. But the 
record supports the conclusion that, aside from a single thousand-dollar 
check, the Markhams received nothing for their investment because the 
-21-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
company's liabilities always exceeded its assets, the company had trouble 
selling its products, what sales it did have were never sufficient to cover 
expenses, and the inventory was ultimately seized. 
The Crime Victims Restitution Act authorizes a sentencing court to 
impose restitution "[w]hen a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that 
has resulted in pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301 (West 
2004); id. §77-38a-302(1) (West Supp. 2015).5 The statute defines "pecuniary 
damages" as "all demonstrable economic injury, ... which a person could 
recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities." Id. §77-38a-102(6) (West Supp. 2015). The 
relevant civil-action analog to securities fraud involving material 
representations and omissions is a civil action under section 61-1-22 of the 
Utah Code. See id. §61-1-22(1) (West 2012) (authorizing a civil action to 
recover for violations of section 61-1-1(2)). 
Section 61-1-22 provides two bases for calculating damages. The first 
applies when the victim returns the security he or she purchased. The 
statute allows the victim to recover the consideration paid for the security, 
5 Defendant cites the current version of the Utah Code for all statutory 
citations in his opening brief and does not argue that any a1nendment 
affects the outco1ne of this case. The State likewise cites the current version 
of the Utah Code for all statutory citations. 
-22-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"less the amount of income received on the security." Id. §61-1-22(1)(b). 
The second allows the victim to recover "da1nages" if the victim no longer 
owns the security. Id. Such damages are calculated by subtracting from the 
value of the consideration "the amount of income received on the security" 
and "the value of the security when the buyer disposed of the security." Id. 
§61-1-22(1)(b), (c)(i). 6 
As Defendant acknowledges, the second approach applies here 
because Bill no longer owns the security. Aplt. Br. at 30-31. But 
Defendant's application of the statute is inconsistent with the facts of this 
case. In exchange for his investment, Bill received partial ownership of 
6 Although the provision addressing how to calculate damages cross-
references "Subsection (7)(b)," that cross-reference is most likely a 
typographical error and was intended to be "Subsection (1)(b)." See Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)(c). Although section 61-1-22 contains a subsection 
7(b), the cross-reference to subsection 7(b) is illogical and, if applied, absurd. 
The statute says to "subtract from the amount that would be recoverable 
upon a tender under Subsection (7)(b) the value of the security when the 
buyer disposed of the security." Id. Subsection 7(b) refers to situations-
patently inapplicable here-where recovery is prohibited, and says nothing 
of a tender. Id. §61-1-22(7)(b). Thus, if read literally, damages would be 
calculated by subtracting from $0-that is, from the amount recoverable 
under subsection (7)(b)- the value of the security when it was disposed of. 
In other words, the victim would be required to pay the fraudster. The 
better reading of the statute is to read the "tender" reference as referring to 
the victhn's return of the security discussed in subsection (1)(b). See State v. 
Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, if 31, 243 P.3d 1250 ("We read statutory provisions literally, 
unless such a reading would result in an unreasonable or inoperable result." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Clarcon Labs and Clarcon Distributing and at least the promise of stock, if 
not the actual thing. It is that security- and not the inventory - that is to be 
valued when considering the Markhams' loss. See §61-1-22(1). And the 
evidence from trial is undisputed: The Markhams did not recover the 
principal they invested and they received no profits frmn that investment, 
either before Clarcon Lab and Clarcon Distributing were dissolved or 
during the two years following that dissolution. R343:99-100, 121; 346:78, 
107; 347:382, 432, 467-68, 476, 482. Aside frmn a single check for $1,129.67, 
Bill never received any salary or commission from the venture. R346:78; 
347:432; SE8 at 7. Even factoring in the $500,000 worth of inventory 
Defendant returned to the venture, the Markhams did not receive any 
income from it because sales were at best anemic and because expenses far 
exceeded any sales revenue. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:353, 476. Thus, 
at most, $1,129.67 in "income received on the security" could be subtracted 
from the $247,000 consideration the Markhams paid for that security, 
yielding a net loss of $245,870.33. See id. §61-1-22(1)(b). 
But the damages are not reduced any further by subtracting "the 
value of the security when the buyer disposed of the security." Id. §61-1-
22(1)(c)(i). Bill disposed of the security-his position in Clarcon Labs and 
Clarcon Dish·ibuting-when the two companies were dissolved. But even 
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accounting for the $82,276.83 worth of fixed assets and $500,000 worth of 
inventory, the Markhams' security was worthless when the companies were 
dissolved because the companies' liabilities far outweighed any of the 
assets. R343:107; 347:476, 482. In light of the venture' s abysmal financial 
state, the trial court would have been well within its discretion to order 
restitution of at least $245,870.33, and not to offset the Markhams' damages 
by the face value of the company's fixed assets. 7 
The calculus does not improve for Defendant if disposal of the 
security is measured from late 2009 when Bill finally gave up on the 
venture. Cf Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, iJ 57, 201 P.3d 966, 
holding modified on other grounds by Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
King, 2013 UT 13, ~57, 297 P.3d 619 (concluding in a common law 
fraudulent inducement suit that "the employee is entitled to recover the 
difference between the compensation provided by the employer whom the 
employee was induced to leave and the compensation that follows"). The 
Markhams still had not made any income on their investment, R343:99-100, 
108-09, 121; 346:78, 107, and the inventory was rendered worthless when 
7 The trial court's restitution award is also conservative in light of 
section 61-1-22's explicit authorization of 12% annual interest as recoverable 
damages and treble damages for intentional or reckless securities offenses. 
See Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)(c)(ii), (2)(a). The single thousand-dollar 
check Bill received did not even cover one month's interest. 
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the FDA seized it, R153-55; 343:112-13. Thus, over the two-year period that 
Bill headed the venture, there was no income and no value in the security to 
subtract from the consideration paid by the Markhams in 2007. 
Furthermore, the trial court would have been within its broad 
discretion to order even more restitution than it did for yet another reason. 
Section 61-1-22 states that the civil remedy it provides is "in addition to any 
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity." Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-22(10)(a).8 Under a common law suit for fraudulent 
inducement, the Markhams could have recovered far more than the 
consideration paid for the worthless security. Utah follows the benefit-of-
the-bargain rule. E.g., Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974). Under 
that rule, "in an action for fraud and deceit the measure of damages is the 
difference between the actual value of what the party received and the 
value thereof if it had been as represented." Id. In other words, damages 
are not limited to the consideration paid for the security or other out-of-
pocket expenses. Id. See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §376 
8 A civil action under section 61-1-22 is also limited to violations of 
section 61-1-1(2) (fraudulent statements and omissions) and other statutes 
not relevant here. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)(a). It does not cover 
violations of section 61-1-1(3) (fraudulent or deceitful acts, practices, or 
courses of business). Id. Defendant was charged with both variants of 
securities fraud, and the trial court concluded that the evidence supported 
each variant. R2, *155. 
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( defining the benefit-of-the-bargain rule as "a punitive measure which 
compels a party guilty of fraud to make good his or her representations"). 
Here, Defendant falsely told Bill that Clarcon Distributing was a "solid" 
investment with projected profits of over $15.4 million in the first year. 
R346:45; SEl. Bill was promised a 25% stake in the company, which would 
translate to over $3.8 million in projected profits. SES. Given the common 
law rule, the State's requested restitution and the trial court's order were 
quite conservative. 
In sum, regardless of what timeframe is used to measure the 
Markhams' loss, the inventory did not compensate them for their 
investment in light of the complete evidentiary picture. The Markhams thus 
lost at least $164,000 of their investment due to Defendant's fraudulent 
actions, and the trial court was well within its discretion to order restitution 
in that amount. 
B. Defendant was convicted of securities fraud-not 
transacting business as an unlicensed broker-dealer 
or agent-and those fraudulent actions were the but-
for cause of the victims' loss. 
Defendant argues that his actions are not the but-for cause of the 
Markhams' loss because he was convicted of- or at least accepted 
responsibility only for-selling securities without a license. Aplt. Br. at 24, 
26, 30. 
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Contrary to Defendant's repeated assertions, Defendant was charged 
with, convicted of, and sentenced for securities fraud under section 61-1-1 of 
the Utah Code, not selling a security without a license or transacting 
business as an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent in violation of section 61-
1-3. Rl-2, 121; R347:530. And Defendant's fraudulent actions are the direct 
cause of the Markhams parting with their money and joining a failed 
venture. 
As noted, the Crime Victims Restitution Act authorizes restitution 
"[w]hen a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-301. As the statute suggests, 
there must be a causal nexus between the defendant's criminal activity and 
the pecuniary damages suffered by the victim. This Court has defined the 
requisite causal nexus using a modified but-for test: "A modified 'but for' 
test requires that (1) the damages 'would not have occurred but for the 
conduct underlying the . . . [defendant's] conviction' and (2) the 'causal 
nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss ... is not too attenuated 
(either factually or temporally)."' State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ifll, 221 
P.3d 273 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting State v. McBride, 
940 P.2d 539,544 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
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But before causation can be determined, the court must first 
determine what" criminal activity" is at issue. See Utah Code Ann. §77-38a-
301. The statute defines criminal activity as II any offense of which the 
defendant is convicted." Id. §77-38a-102(2). Criminal activity also includes 
11 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility 
to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct." Id. Here, Defendant was convicted of securities fraud 
under section 61-1-1, not engaging in unlicensed transactions under section 
61-1-3. 
Section 61-1-3 makes it unlawful for anyone to transact business "as a 
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed" to do so. Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-3(1) (West 2012); see also id. §61-1-13(1)(c)(i) (defining 11broker-
dealer" in part as "a person engaged in the business of effecting transactions 
in securities for the account of others or for the person's own account"). 
Section 61-1-1 makes it unlawful for anyone-licensed or not- "in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security" to either 
directly or indirectly (1) "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud"; (2) make "any untrue statement of a material fact" or omit to 
make any statement of material fact that would render the statement not 
misleading; or (3) "engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Id. §61-1-
1. Securities fraud under section 61-1-1 may be a second degree felony 
depending on the value of the security or the circumstances of the victim, 
but engaging in securities transactions without a license is punishable only 
as a third degree felony. Id. §61-1-21(1), (2) (West 2012). 
The criminal information filed in this case referred to the second and 
third variants of securities fraud under section 61-1-1, and it charged 
Defendant with a second degree felony. Rl-2. The testimony and 
argument presented by both parties at trial extensively covered the issue of 
whether Defendant willfully misrepresented or omitted material facts when 
he pitched the investment to the Markhams. See, e.g., R347:491-507 
(prosecutor's closing argument); R347:507-24 (defendant's closing 
argument). And the few times Defendant's lack of a license came up at trial 
was always to emphasize that Defendant never told the Markhams that he was 
unlicensed to sell securities. R346:109, 130-31. When the trial court 
announced its verdict, it specifically mentioned misrepresentations and 
omissions and stated that Defendant was guilty of securities fraud, not 
selling securities without a license. R347:530. Accordingly, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant for second degree felony securities fraud. R121. The 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
facts proven at trial demonstrated that Defendant made numerous untrue 
statements of material fact, omitted to state numerous material facts, and 
engaged in an act, practice, or course of business which operated as a fraud 
or deceit upon the Markhams." R*155. And the trial court rejected 
Defendant's argument, made in a motion to reconsider the restitution order, 
that it had incorrectly entered a conviction under section 61-1-1 rather than 
61-1-3. R344:11. 
Defendant cites no record support for his assertion that he was 
convicted and sentenced for transacting business as an unlicensed broker-
dealer or agent. Aplt. Br. at 24, 26, 30. And he acknowledges that the trial 
court specifically rejected this argument below. Aplt. Br. at 16; R344:11. The 
only evidence Defendant points to in the record is his statement to the 
investigator who prepared the presentence report, where Defendant 
accepted responsibility only for selling a security without a license.9 R101. 
But Defendant's refusal to accept responsibility for the crime for which 
he was convicted is irrelevant to the question of what losses his crilninal 
9 Defendant also asserts on appeal that he made similar statements at 
the sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. at 30. But Defendant did not provide a 
transcript of the sentencing hearing on appeal and thus caimot rely on what 
was said there to support his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2); State v. 
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211, if 4, 257 P.3d 1103 (per curiam) (" An appellant has 
the burden to provide an adequate record for review."). 
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activity caused. As noted, the law authorizes the sentencing court to 
impose restitution resulting from criminal conduct for which a defendant 
admits responsibility, even if the defendant was not convicted based on that 
conduct. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(1)(b), (4)(a) (West 2015); id. §77-38a-
102(2); id. §77-38a-302(1), (5)(a). But restitution is not limited to what a 
defendant is willing to pay. The court may also impose restitution for any 
loss caused by a crime for which a defendant was actually convicted. See id. 
§§76-3-201(1)(b), (4)(a); 77-38a-102(2); 77-38a-302(1), (5)(a); State v. Poulsen, 
2012 UT App 292, iflO, 288 P.3d 601; State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, if 18-
9, 60 P.3d 582. To hold otherwise would create a strong incentive for 
defendants to deny responsibility for the crimes for which they have been 
convicted in an attempt to limit restitution. 
In 1nost cases, the criminal conviction itself satisfies the requirement 
that "liability is clear as a matter of law" before entering an order for 
restitution. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The 
defendant's refusal to admit responsibility for criminal activity only 
becomes an issue when the trial court attempts to order restitution for losses 
not caused by the crime for which the defendant was convicted or pleaded 
guilty. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, ,r9, 221 P.3d 277 (holding 
that h1 ial court may not infer criminal liability for actions not covered by 
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defendant's guilty plea); State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, ,IS, 987 P.2d 1289 
(same). That is not the case here. 
Because Defendant was convicted of securities fraud, the causal link 
between Defendant's criminal activity and the Markhams' loss must focus 
on Defendant's fraudulent actions, misrepresentations, and omissions, not 
his licensing status. But for Defendant's fraud, the Markhams would not 
have parted with their money and invested in a failed venture. Bill and 
Susan both testified that Defendant's false statement that he had invested 
$500,000 of his own money was important to their decision to invest. 
R346:45, 125-26. Susan was leery of investing in a new company that 
needed investors' money to function. R346:125-26. The financial records 
submitted at trial demonstrate that Clarcon Labs and Clarcon Distributing 
were dependent on the Markhams' investment to meet day-to-day 
operating expenses and to pay off debts-not simply to update antiquated 
production equipment. SE7, 8. Had the Markhams known that, they would 
not have invested. Defendant's fraudulent statements and omissions were 
thus the but-for cause of the Markhams losing their investment. 
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C. The victims' loss did not become too attenuated from 
Defendant's fraudulent actions simply because 
Defendant was not involved in the venture when it 
was finally terminated. 
In addition to but-for causation, restitution requires that the victims' 
loss not be factually or temporally too attenuated from the Defendant's 
criminal actions. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ifll. Defendant argues that the 
State cannot meet the second part of the causation test because the 
Markhams lost the value of their investment in 2009 when the FDA seized 
the inventory from Bill's company. 10 Defendant asserts that event was too 
attenuated from Defendant's fraudulent actions both factually and 
temporally. Aplt. Br. at 24-26. Defendant also argues that the h·ial court 
"decline[ d] to consider [his] position that Markham's losses were caused by 
Markham's own negligence in not abiding by FDA regulations." Aplt. Br. at 
37. See State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, if 27 n.4 (noting that in detennining 
amount of restitution, the trial court "cannot decline to consider evidence 
that a victim's losses were caused" by someone other than defendant). 
The h·ial court considered Defendant's arguments and the evidence 
he presented in support. R*153. That the h·ial court viewed the evidence 
'
0 Defendant actually frames his argument in terms of the FDA 
shutting down Bill's company. But Bill was adamant at trial that the FDA 
did not shut down the co1npany, nor did it force Bill and Omar to do so. 
R343:110-12. They may have been left with little choice given the 
circmnstances, but it was still their choice to make. 
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i (jj 
i 
differently than Defendant does not mean the trial court declined to 
consider it. In light of the record evidence, the trial court's conclusion was 
reasonable. Indeed, when the full evidentiary picture is viewed, the causal 
nexus is clear and strong. The Markhams lost the value of their investment 
because they invested in a debt-ridden company that had trouble 
generating sales, and they were induced to invest by Defendant's material 
misrepresentations and mnissions. The FDA' s seizure of the unsafe product 
merely marked the end to Bill's prolonged and futile attempt to salvage 
something from what had been a failed inveshnent from the beginning. In 
other words, the loss had already occurred by the time Defendant separated 
from the venture. Any intervening events Defendant identifies do not 
undermine the causal nexus. 
Even if Bill's conb·ol of the company and the FD A's seizure of the 
product were relevant, those intervening events do not undermine the 
causal nexus because they were foreseeable. In the context of restitution, 
this Court has held that an intervening force does not make a victim's loss 
too attenuated from the defendant's actions as long as the intervening force 
is reasonably foreseeable. State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 543-45 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). In McBride, for example, the defendant was caught joyriding, 
the police were unable to locate the owner of the car because they 
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mistranscribed the vehicle's information, and the car was impounded and 
eventually sold. Id. at 540-41. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution for 
the car, but he argued on appeal that the police's negligent conduct was an 
intervening cause that broke the causal nexus between his criminal conduct 
and the victim's loss. Id. at 541. This Court rejected the argument, 
concluding that the causal nexus was not broken because "the negligence of 
the police in transcribing the vehicle identification number was [not] so 
unforeseeable as to supersede the fault" of the defendant in causing the loss. 
Id. at 544. 
1. The causal chain is not factually too attenuated. 
Defendant argues that the causal chain is factually too attenuated 
because the Markhams' loss was a result of "production noncompliance 
with federal regulations." Aplt. Br. at 26. In other words, he argues that the 
Markhams lost the value of their investment not because of Defendant's 
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, but because the FDA seized 
the inventory as a result of Bill's actions at a tilne when Defendant was not 
involved in the venture. Aplt. Br. at 24. The inventory, he claims, was not 
valueless when he gave it to Bill. Aplt. Br. at 37. 
But the Markhams' loss of their security occurred in 2007 when they 
invested in a company laden with debt and unable to sell enough product to 
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cover basic operating expenses. Neither Omar's original company, 
Defendant's distribution company, nor Bill's subsequent company ever 
made a profit. R343:99-100, 121; 346:107; 347:382, 417, 432, 476, 482. Each 
company had significant debt, and although some sales apparently took 
place, most fell through. R343:89, 110, 121-22; 346:78; 347:353, 476. And 
Defendant was aware of the financial state of the Clarcon venture when he 
separated from it. R347:382, 417, 432, 434-38, 476, 482. Thus, the 
Markhams' loss of the complete value of their invesbnent would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to Defendant and anyone else in that situation. Cf 
State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, 8jf ~45-48, 224 P.3d 720 (concluding that 
value of a loan co-defendant took out using victims' investment as collateral 
"flow[ed] from the fraudulent securities transaction and [was] properly 
charged against" defendant, but remanding to determine whether to credit 
defendant for payments victims received on their investment). 
The inventory Defendant returned to Bill did not change the 
company's financial situation. With a retail value of $500,000, the inventory 
was not "valueless" on its face. But its value was not sufficient to offset the 
debts that Bill had also assumed in exchange for his investment, particularly 
in light of lackluster product sales and high operating expenses. The 
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seizure of the product in 2009 simply put an end to Bill's persistent and 
futile efforts to salvage the investment. 
Significantly, the reason that the FDA seized the product was not 
because of Bill's noncompliance with federal regulations. Rather, it did so 
because the product that Defendant got the Markhams to invest in was 
unsafe. R343:110-12. That fact is clear from the exhibits Defendant 
presented to the trial court in opposition to the State's restitution request. 
The FDA inspection report listed several procedural violations, ranging 
from a lack of quality controls to poor record keeping. R157-60. The report 
was issued at the beginning of May 2009. R160. The FDA did not seized the 
inventory then or take any other adverse action against Bill's company. It 
was not until June 2009 that the FDA ordered the company to cease 
production of the contaminated product, recall it, and destroy it. R153-55; 
343:110-12. Then on July 31, 2009, the FDA seized the company's product 
because it was not satisfied with the company's recall and destruction 
efforts. R153-55; 343:110-12. The seizure was based not on regulatory 
noncompliance. It was based on the presence of harmful bacteria in the 
product. R153-55; 343:110-12. Though Bill's company had apparently 
added other product lines, it was producing the same product in 2009 as it 
was when Defendant convinced Bill to invest in Clarcon in 2007. R26-27, 
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155. Defendant has not shown that Omar ever changed the formula or that 
the product that was unsafe in 2009 was somehow safe in 2007. 
The Markhams' loss is thus not factually attenuated from Defendant's 
fraudulent actions. The loss occurred in 2007, and the FDA's seizure of the 
product merely put an end to the Markhams' attempts to recover from that 
loss. Given Defendant's intimate knowledge of the abysmal financial state 
of the Clarcon venture, it was reasonably foreseeable that the Markhams 
would not recoup their investment. 11 
11 Defendant also presents what he terms an alternative argument, 
asserting that if the inventory he returned to Bill is deemed worthless, fault 
for its loss in value should be apportioned to Bill. Aplt. Br. at 33-37. 
Although Defendant relies on comparative negligence statutes and cases to 
support his argument, the argument is really a restatement of his claim that 
the causal nexus is too attenuated because Bill is responsible for the loss. 
To the extent Defendant intends to present an independent argument 
based on comparative negligence, that argument is unpreserved and should 
not be addressed. R148-*49, *159-77. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r11, 
10 P.3d 346 (" As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may 
not be raised on appeal."). The argument is also foreclosed by precedent. 
In the appropriate case, "comparative negligence may be relevant in 
determining restitution." Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,I27 (emphasis added). But 
as its name suggests, comparative negligence applies only to negligence 
actions. See State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Securities fraud explicitly requires a mental state of willfulness. Utah Code 
Ann. §§61-1-1; 61-1-21; State v. Moore, 2015 UT App 112, 'UlO, 349 P.3d 797 
(reiterating that securities fraud requires a mental state of willfulness; 
recklessness does not suffice). 
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2. The causal chain is not temporally too attenuated. 
Defendant also argues that the causal chain is temporally too 
attenuated because Bill's company was dissolved two years after Defendant 
was last involved in the venture. Aplt. Br. at 25. For support, Defendant 
points to State v. Brown, where this Court held that relocation expenses 
incurred seven to eight months after a burglary and assault were temporally 
too attenuated from the crimes to justify restitution. Aplt. Br. at 25. See 
Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ,I,Il, 11. 
Again, the Markhams' loss of their investment was reasonably 
foreseeable, even if it took two years for Bill to give up his efforts to salvage 
that investment. Defendant's argument about temporal attenuation would 
have more force if the venture had been profitable up until the FDA seized 
the inventory. But it was not. As discussed, the undisputed evidence is that 
Clarcon-in all its iterations-never made a profit. R343:99-100, 121; 
346:107; 347:382, 417, 432, 467-68, 476, 482. When Defendant left the 
venture, Bill had the fixed assets of the company and the product inventory. 
But he also had its debts. And selling the product to cover those debts and 
any operating expenses apparently was not as easy as Defendant had led 
Bill to believe it would be. R343:89, 107, 110, 121-22; 346:78; 347:353. Given 
the venture's financial history, of which Defendant was well aware, the loss 
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of the Markhams' investment was reasonably foreseeable no matter how 
long Bill worked to salvage it. 
Defendant convinced Bill and Susan to part with $247,000 based on 
material misrepresentations and omissions. Aside from a single thousand-
dollar check, the Markhams never recouped any of their money because it 
was a bad investment from the very beginning. That did not change when 
Bill took over control of the company and Defendant gave Bill the inventory 
he had been keeping as security. 
* * * 
In sum, the Markhams' loss is clear, as is the causal nexus between it 
and Defendant's fraudulent actions. The causal nexus did not become 
attenuated because of what happened after Defendant left the picture. The 
security the Markhams received- Bill's position in the company- was 
valueless from the time he received it in 2007 to the time he abandoned it in 
2009. Given the debts, the high operating costs, the lackluster sales, and the 
ultilnate seizure of the product, the inventory Defendant gave Bill did not 
affect the value of the Markhams' security. The trial court thus acted within 
its broad discretion when it ordered Defendant to pay $164,723.17 in 
restitution. 
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II 
The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's 
conclusion that Defendant caused the victims' loss. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the trial court's conclusion that he caused the Markhams' loss. Aplt. Br. at 
43-45. Defendant acknowledges that the State presented evidence that he 
caused the Markhams' loss of their initial $247,000 investment. Aplt. Br. at 
43. But he argues that once he responded with evidence that an offset was 
appropriate, the State was required to rebut that evidence. Aplt. Br. at 43. 
He thus argues that the trial court's causation ruling was clearly erroneous 
because the State presented no evidence of a connection between the 
product inventory and the dissolution of Bill's company due to regulatory 
noncompliance. Aplt. Br. at 43-45. 
Regardless of whether the burden-shifting scheme Defendant 
describes is accurate, Defendant has not demonstrated that an offset was 
appropriate. As shown above, the relevant inquiry is whether the record 
contains evidence of the causal nexus between Defendant's fraudulent actions 
and the Markhams' loss of their $247,000 investment-not between the 
inventory and the FDA' s actions. The product inventory is relevant only to 
the extent that it had value sufficient to con1pensate the Markhams for at 
least some portion of their investment. As should be clear from the 
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discussion above, the record contains evidence sufficient to support the 
conclusion that the inventory was not sufficiently valuable to compensate 
the Markhams, either when Defendant gave it to Bill or when Bill ultimately 
gave up his effort to salvage his investment two years later. R343:89, 99-
100, 107, 110, 121-22; 346:78, 107; 347:353, 382, 417, 432, 467-68, 476, 482. 
The evidence necessary to rebut Defendant's claim of an offset was already 
in the record, having been admitted at trial. Furthermore, the evidence of 
each Clarcon entity's financial disarray was undisputed at trial. 
Defendant asserts in passing that Bill's company had $6 million in 
sales after Defendant left the company. Aplt. Br. at 31; R168-69. But even if 
that is correct, it does not account for the undisputed trial testimony that 
each iteration of Clarcon was beset with debt and high operating costs and 
could never generate enough sales to make a profit. R343:89, 99-100, 110, 
121-22; 346:78, 107; 347:353, 382, 417, 432, 476, 482. Saddled with the 
venture' s liabilities, Bill worked for two years to salvage his investment but 
ultimately failed. R343:110-11, 114. The trial court's conclusion that 
Defendant caused the Markhams' loss is not clearly erroneous, particularly 
when viewed in light of record evidence that no matter how much 
inventory was actually sold, it never resulted in any recovery of the 
Markhams' inveshnent. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on April 6, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2012) 
Utah Code Annotated§ 61-1-1. Fraud unlawful 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of 
any security, directly or indirectly to: 
<iP (1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (West 2012) 
Utah Code Annotation § 61-1-3. Licensing of broker - dealers, agents, 
investment advisers, and investment adviser representatives 
(1) It is unlawful for a person to transact business in this state as a broker-dealer 
or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter. 
(2)(a) It is unlawful for a broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an agent 
unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective during any 
period when the agent is not associated with: 
(i) a particular broker-dealer licensed under this chapter; or 
(ii) a particular issuer. 
(b) When an agent begins or terminates an association with a broker-dealer or 
issuer, or begins or terminates activities as an agent, the agent and the 
broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly notify the division. 
(c) An agent who terminates an association with a broker-dealer or issuer is 
considered to be unlicensed until the day on which the division: 
(i) approves the agent's association with a different broker-dealer or issuer; 
and 
(ii) notifies the agent of the division's approval of the association. 
(d)(i) It is unlawful for a broker-dealer or an issuer engaged, directly or 
indirectly, in offering, offering to purchase, purchasing, or selling a security in 
this state, to employ or associate with an individual to engage in an activity 
related to a securities transaction in this state if: 
(A)(I) the license of the individual is suspended or revoked; or 
(II) the individual is barred from employment or association with a 
broker-dealer, an issuer, or a state or federal covered investment 
adviser; and 
(B) the suspension, revocation, or bar described in Subsection (2)(d)(i)(A) is 
by an order: 
(I) under this chapter; 
(II) of the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
(III) of a self-regulatory organization; or 
(IV) of a securities administrator of a state other than Utah. 
(ii) A broker-dealer or issuer does not violate this Subsection (2)( d) if the 
broker-dealer or issuer did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the suspension, revocation, or bar. 
(iii) An order under this chapter may modify or waive, in whole or in part, 
the application of Subsection (2)( d)(i) to a broker-dealer or issuer. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(3) It is unlawful for a person to transact business in this state as an investment 
adviser or as an investment adviser representative unless: 
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; 
(b) the person's only clients in this state are: 
(i) one or more of the following whether acting for itself or as a trustee with 
investment control: 
(A) an investment company as defined in the Investment Company Act of 
19401; 
(B) another investment adviser; 
(C) a federal covered adviser; 
(D) a broker-dealer; 
(E) a depository institution; 
(F) a trust company; 
(G) an insurance company; 
(H) an employee benefit plan with assets of not less than $1,000,000; or 
(I) a governmental agency or instrumentality; or 
(ii) other institutional investors as are designated by rule or order of the 
director; or 
( c) the person: 
(i) is licensed in another state as an investment adviser or an investment 
adviser representative; 
(ii) has no place of business in this state; and 
(iii) during the preceding 12-month period has had not more than five 
clients, other than those specified in Subsection (3)(b), who are residents of 
this state. 
(4)(a) It is unlawful for: 
(i) a person required to be licensed as an investment adviser under this 
chapter to employ an investment adviser representative unless the 
investment adviser representative is licensed under this chapter, except that 
the license of an investment adviser representative is not effective during any 
period when the person is not employed by an investment adviser licensed 
under this chapter; 
(ii) a federal covered adviser to employ, supervise, or associate with an 
investment adviser representative having a place of business located in this 
state, unless the investment adviser representative is: 
(A) licensed under this chapter; or 
(B) exempt from licensing; or 
(iii) an investment adviser, directly or indirectly, to employ or associate with 
an individual to engage in an activity related to providing investment advice 
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in this state if: 
(A)(I) the license of the individual is suspended or revoked; or 
(II) the individual is barred from employment or association with a 
state or federal covered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or issuer; 
and 
(B) the suspension, revocation, or bar is by an order: 
(I) under this chapter; 
(II) of the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
(III) a self-regulatory organization; or 
(IV) a securities administrator of a state other than Utah. 
(b)(i) An investment adviser does not violate Subsection (4)(a)(iii) if the 
investment adviser did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the suspension, revocation, or bar. 
(ii) An order under this chapter may waive, in whole or in part, the 
application of Subsection (4)(a)(iii) to an investment adviser. 
(c) When an investment adviser representative required to be licensed under 
this chapter begins or terminates employment with an investment adviser, 
the investment adviser shall promptly notify the division. 
( d) An investment adviser representative who terminates association with 
an investment adviser is considered unlicensed until the day on which the 
division: 
(i) approves the investment adviser representative's association with a 
different investment adviser; and 
(ii) notifies the investment adviser representative of the division's 
approval of 
the association. 
(5) Except with respect to an investment adviser whose only clients are those 
described under Subsections (3)(b) or (3)(c)(iii), it is unlawful for a federal 
covered adviser to conduct advisory business in this state unless the person 
complies with Section 61-1-4. 
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Utah Code Ann. 61-1-21 (West 2012) 
Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-21. Penalties for violations 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates: 
(a) a provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16; 
(b) an order issued under this chapter; or 
(c) Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made is false or misleading in a 
material respect. 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person who willfully violates 
Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the 
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was 
worth less than $10,000; or 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, 
the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained 
was worth $10,000 or more. 
(3) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree 
felony if: 
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $10,000; and 
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any 
money representing: 
(i) equity in a person's primary residence; 
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account; 
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal 
Revenue Code1; 
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue 
influence; or 
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult. 
(4) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
three years or more than 15 years if: 
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and 
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any 
money representing: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(i) equity in a person's primary residence; 
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account; 
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal ~ 
Revenue Code; 
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue 
influence; or 
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult. 
(5) It is an affirmative defense under this section against a claim that the person 
violated an order issued under this chapter for the person to prove that the 
person had no knowledge of the order. 
(6) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the 
sentencing judge may impose a penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection 
61-1-20(2)(6). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22 (West 2012) 
Utah Code Annotated§ 61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation--Remedies--
Limitation of actions 
(l)(a) This Subsection (1) applies to a person who: 
(i) offers or sells a security in violation of: 
(A) Subsection 61-1-3(1); 
(B) Section 61-1-7; 
(C) Subsection 61-1-17(2); 
(D) a rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which requires the affirmative 
approval of sales literature before it is used; or 
(E) a condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61-1-11(7); or 
(ii) offers, sells, or purchases a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2). 
(b) A person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable to a person selling the 
security to or buying the security from the person described in Subsection 
(l)(a). The person to whom the person described in Subsection (l)(a) is liable 
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the 
security, together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, 
costs, and reasonable attorney fees, less the amount of income received on the 
security, upon the tender of the security or for damages if the person no 
longer owns the security. 
( c) Damages are an amount calculated as follows: 
(i) subtract from the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender under 
Subsection (7)(b) the value of the security when the buyer disposed of the 
security; and 
(ii) add to the amount calculated under Subsection (l)(c)(i) interest at: 
(A) 12% per year: 
(I) beginning the day on which the security is purchased by the buyer; 
and 
(II) ending on the date of disposition; and 
(B) after the period described in Subsection (l)(c)(ii)(A), 12% per year on 
the amount lost at disposition. 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount equal 
to three times the consideration paid for the security, together with interest, 
costs, and attorney fees, less any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon 
a showing that: 
(a) the violation was reckless or intentional; or 
(b) the violation was of Subsection 61-1-1(2), was negligent, and it is 
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demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the violation involved an 
investment by a person over whom the violator exercised undue influence. 
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is 
not liable under Subsection (l)(a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or 
omission, or the seller did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known of the untrue statement or misleading omission. 
(4)(a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable 
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, 
every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every 
employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or purchase, 
and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale or purchase are 
also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller or 
purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that the nonseller or nonpurchaser did not know, and in exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason 
of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so 
liable. 
(5) A tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of 
judgment. 
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of a person who might 
have been a plaintiff or defendant. 
(7)(a) An action may not be maintained to enforce liability under this section 
unless brought before the earlier of: 
(i) the expiration of five years after the act or transaction constituting the 
violation; or 
(ii) the expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the 
facts constituting the violation. 
(b) A person may not sue under this section if: 
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a time 
when the buyer or seller owned the security, to refund the consideration 
paid together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, less 
the amount of any income received on the security, and the buyer or seller 
failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or 
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a time when 
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the buyer or seller did not own the security, unless the buyer or seller 
rejected the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt. 
(8) A person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in 
violation of this chapter or any rule or order issued under this chapter, or who 
has acquired a purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the 
facts by reason of which its making or performance was in violation, may not 
base a suit on the contract. 
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a security to 
waive compliance with this chapter or a rule or order issued under this chapter is 
void. 
(10)(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any 
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 
(b) This chapter does not create a cause of action not specified in this section or 
Subsection 61-1-4(6). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2015) 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201. Definitions--Sentences or combination of 
sentences allowed--Civil penalties 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out 
of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and 
includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
( d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for 
Victims of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages 
as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
( c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
( d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
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(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow 
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime 
Victims Restitution Act. 
(c) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court, 
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 63M-7-503 and 77-38a-401, shall enter: 
(i) a civil judgment for complete restitution for the full amount of expenses 
paid on behalf of the victim by the Utah Office for Victims of Crime; and 
(ii) an order of restitution for restitution payable to the Utah Office for 
Victims of Crime in the same amount unless otherwise ordered by the 
court pursuant to Subsection (4)(d). 
( d) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under 
Subsection (4)(c) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the 
restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (vi) and provide findings of its decision on the 
record. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant shall pay restitution of 
goverm11ental transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within 
the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to 
appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
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(S)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $100 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $200 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $350 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (S)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
( d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make 
restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless 
otherwise ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant 
shall pay restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration and costs of 
medical care provided to the defendant while in the county correctional 
facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional 
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided 
under Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, 
as defined in Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in 
Section 64-13e-102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount 
determined by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily 
inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county 
correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing 
!easonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with 
a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical 
and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
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(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this 
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the 
restitution, the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 
77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (vi) and shall enter the reason for its order on the 
record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the 
defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2015) 
Utah Coe Annotated §77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on 
the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, 
make restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or 
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive 
or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and 
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges 
upon which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, 
or any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other 
jurisdiction or where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance'' means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
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prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from 
the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him 
nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific 
conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(10) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions 
upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be 
held in abeyance. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from 
the time of sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a 
reward, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction 
of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this 
information, except that the person receiving the payment may not be a 
codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered 
to the public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution 
that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for 
Victims of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
{, .. 
lllU 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-301 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Annotated§ 77-38a-301. Restitution - Convicted defendant may be 
I.@ required to pay 
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 7, eff. April 30, 2001. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Sentencing and Punishment ~-2100. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 350Hk2100. 
\@ C.J.S. Criminal Law§§ 1771 to 1786. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Restitution, 
(@ In general, 
Probation, revocation for failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution, 
equal protection, see Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 
\@ 76 L.Ed.2d 221, on remand 167 Ga.App. 334, 308 S.E.2d 63. 
Amount of restitution, 
Restitution calculation, losses caused by offense of conviction, unauthorized use of 
~ credit card, see Hughey v. U.S., U.S.Tex.1990, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 495 U.S. 411, 109 
L.Ed.2d 408, on remand 907 F.2d 39. 
Restitution as condition of probation, 
Bankruptcy, dischargeability of restitution obligations imposed as conditions of 
probation, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, U.S.Pa.1990, 110 
S.Ct. 2126, 495 U.S. 552, 109 L.Ed.2d 588. 
Bankruptcy, restitution obligation discharge, condition of probation, see Kelly v. 
Robinson, U.S.Conn.1986, 107 S.Ct. 353, 479 U.S. 36, 93 L.Ed.2d 216. 
Consideration of alternatives to incarceration before revocation, see Black v. 
Romano, U.S.Mo.1985, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 471 U.S. 606, 85 L.Ed.2d 636, rehearing denied 
105 S.Ct. 3548, 473 U.S. 921, 87 L.Ed.2d 671. 
Failure of indigent defendant to pay fine and restitution, equal protection, see 
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Bearden v. Georgia, U.S.Ga.1983, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 461 U.S. 660, 76 L.Ed.2d 221, on 
remand 167 Ga.App. 334,308 S.E.2d 63. 
Resentencing, drug possession, see U.S. v. Granderson, U.S.Ga.1994, 114 S.Ct. 1259, <., 
511 U.S. 39, 127 L.Ed.2d 611. 
Current_through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2015) 
Utah Code Annotated §77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim 
for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court 
record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any crhninal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court 
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss 
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
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(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized 
by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
reha bili ta tion; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost 
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were 
owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment 
at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in 
the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider: 
(i) the factors listed in Subsections (S)(a) and (b); 
(ii) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial 
declaration described in Section 77-38a-204; 
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(v) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment; and 
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (S)(d)(ii), the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one 
year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court 
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons 
and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, 
refer an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for 
determination of restitution. 
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(August 28, 2012 - State v. Bi rd) 
physically gave you or delivered the check? 
A. Judy. 
Q. Who's Judy? 
A. She is the -- Lane Bird's sister, and accountant to 
the company. 
Q. Is that Judy Johnson? 
Yes, it is. A. 
Q. Okay. Other than the $1,100 check that you 
received, did you ever receive any salary payment at all? 
A. No. 
Q. The paragraph mentions commissions. Did you ever 
make any commissions? 
A. No. 
Why not? Q. 
A. Never got a check. Sales apparently were not there, 
and there was no commissions to be paid. 
Q. Talks about a corporate profit sharing plan. And 
again, I'm still focussing on paragraph 6. Did you believe, 
again, you were going to be part of some profit sharing plan 
that would give you portions of the profits of this company, or 
these companies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Flipping over the page to paragraph 7. This 
mentions your involvement in Clarcon Labs. You have been 
appointed COO -- that's chief operating officer; is that 
Kelly L. Barber-Wilburn, CSR, RPR 
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(August 28. 2012 - State v. Bird) 
out of personal funds. 
Q. So ultimately what happens with the company after 
Mr. Bird is dismissed? You already indicated to this Court 
that you've got $247,000 invested in this company. Did you try 









What. what ultimately happens to the company, sir? 
A. It closes. 
Q. Were you ever able to produce and market this 
product like you had hoped? 
A. No. 
Q. Company ever make a profit? 
A. No. 
Q. How long did you continue to try and get this 
company up and working? 
A. For a couple years. 
Q. When you formed this partnership with Mr. Bonada and 
you began to be involved in the company to that extent, can you 
describe the financial condition of the company at the time? 
A. Pretty bad, when I finally got into the records. 
Lot of debt. Lot of overhead. Virtually nothing in sales. 
Agreements had been changed between distributors. 
Kelly L. Barber-Wilburn, CSR, RPR 
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(August 28, 2012 - State v. Bird) 
Q. At some point there were some issues with the FDA, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 





Now, including your $247,000 investment that you 
made when the Defendant was still involved in the company, how 
much money have you and your wife lost as a result of your 
involvement with Clarcon over the years you tried to get it 
running? How much money, including the $247,000, have you put 
into this venture? 
A. 
Q. 
In full, about 440,000. 
Can you briefly explain to this Court how this has 
impacted your life? 
A. Aside from the obvious of financial indebtedness. 
And working in excess of 60, 70, 80 hours a week in the 
mortgage industry to try to pay the bills, and also to 
subsidize Clarcon Labs (inaudible) the company. We 
obviously our house, we've been trying to salvage. 
Been trying to work with the mortgage company to try 
to work with us on the second mortgage, which they don't want 
to do. And the house is going up for a short sale. And of 
course we have no retirement. We have no other funds. It's 
like being 18 years old all over again and having to start over 
108 
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(August 28, 2012 - State v. Bi rd) 
financially. 
Q. Four hundred and forty thousand dollars you put in 
is gone? 
Gone. A. 
Q. Prior to your investment what, if anything, did the 
Defendant discuss with you about being licensed or not licensed 
to sell securities in the State of Utah? 
A. No discussion. 
Q. Did the Defendant ever discuss with you in any way 
the nature and extent of his civil litigation history? Did he 
discuss with you the fact that he had prior civil judgments 
against him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he ever discuss with you the fact that he had 
prior tax liens against him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he ever mention to you, prior to your 
investment, that he had applied for and received two separate 
bankruptcy discharges? 
A. No. 
Q. With respect to your investment, again, you were 




Did you believe you were purchasing stock? 
Yes. 
Kelly L. Barber-Wilburn, CSR, RPR 
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(August 28, 2012 - State vs. Bird - Partial Transcript) 
or the 89, and what the difference is with 247. Did you ever 





Okay. That was never brought up? Do you have any 
emails where you ever communicate with him saying, you know, 





Which money? The 89,648, or --
Yeah. 
-- the total amount? 
The -- not the 89,648 or the 60,000. The total 





That I would have asked for it back? 
Yeah. 
No. 
Okay. And in October of 2008 you're still running 
the company, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And still making money? 
A. No. 
Q. You're not making any money? 
A. (Moves head from side to side.) 
Q. Okay. The company was - -
MR. ARGUELLO: Again 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Kelly L. Barber-Wilburn, CSR, RPR 
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MR. ARGUELLO: -- I'd just like to ask the witness 
for an answer. 
THE COURT: Please. 
MR. ARGUELLO: You shook your head. I'd just ask 
for a verbal answer. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Well, definition of making money. 
After expenses and everything else, no. 
Q. (By Mr. Gallegos) No, I'm not asking any question. 
Okay. Then you were asked about his civil 
litigation history, that he never did close that -- disclosed 
that to you. Did you ever ask him about any of that? 
A. You said I asked about his civil? 
Q. You were asked previously, by Mr. Arguello, about 
you were -- that Lane Bird never disclosed to you the civil 
litigation history that he had? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you ever ask him? 
A. No. 
Q. And are you aware that, that, you know, judgments 
and, and court records are generally public knowledge? 
A. No. 
Q. You're not aware of that? 
A. (Moves head from side to side.) 
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-- a stock, isn't when you invest in a stock you're 
trying to get something of value? 
A. You're buying in on the ownership. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Equity position. 
Q. Of ownership? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Which has value, right? Isn't that the whole reason 




Okay. And, and at the time you entered into this 







Yes. In my mind, yes. 
And what was that? 
If I could (inaudible) the exhibits? 
Please do. 
Okay. Referring to State Exhibits No. 1, month one, 
one hundred forty-six million -- a hundred forty-six thousand 
five hundred thousand [sic.] Month two, 156,340. Month three, 




That's what you were relying on? 
And --
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regards to some of the people, and I provided some information. 
Q. All I asked is if this is a letter that you 








Okay. And it's dated December 6th, 2007? 
Yes. 




MR. ARGUELLO: No objection, Judge. If he wants to 
move it into evidence, I don't care. 
Q. 
THE COURT: You're offering it? 
MR. GALLEGOS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll receive it. Thank you. 
(By Mr. Gallegos) So all that, and that's Defense 
No. 22. But let me just ask you, in this letter essentially 
this is December 6th of 2007. And you've got, according to 
this letter, all kinds of agreements with cruise lines, the 
government of Mexico, tomato growers in Mexico, EMEX, and of 
course the distributors. 
You also indicate that you've been approached by 
Costco, and maybe lay out some other things indicating 
essentially what your company is doing. Right? 
A. Some advertising and some things that we --
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direction we wanted to go, yes. 
Q. Okay. And so, so your business was moving forward? 
A. It was moving forward. This is in reference to the 
distributors, not specifically with Clarcon Biological Labs, 
that did not have the contracts (inaudible) the distributors 
represented the company (inaudible) agreements. They were in 
the process of (inaudible) agreements. Had agreements. That 
does not necessarily mean they had volume sales. 
Q. Okay. But this -- these were at least some lines 
you had in the water? 
A. It would be like letter of intents, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Interest, yes. 
Q. And then, and then just finally, you indicated that 
you formed a new company with Omar Bonada essentially after 
Lane left the company. Correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that went on for a couple years. And then you 
said that the company -- you guys closed the company down? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How exactly was the -- did you guys just close it 





Okay. You weren't ordered to terminate your 
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No, we were not. 
Okay. Did something occur that affected your 
A. Yes. We -- many of the distributors wanted to get 
the product approved with FDA through what's called a 
"monograph" system. And so such documentation and stuff were 
put together and submitted to FDA. 
And the FDA, when you get your monograph approval, 
then they send out an inspector to look at the facility. And 
while looking at the facility they, um, were not necessarily 
happy with the way that Omar was putting together the product 
and wanted it done a little differently. 
They classified it differently. Wanted some 
different things put into place with regards to the company, 
with regards to the production, and the product itself. Which 
would have been about, you know, 1.2, 1.5 million dollars to 
do. 
They gave us a time period to be compliant. And we 
said possibly with 90 to 120 days. And then they did take some 
samples. And they found some of the samples contaminated with 
some pro - - with some bacteria. It was random. Some had no 
contamination whatsoever. Some had some. Some had lots. Some 
had little. So there was variation throughout the whole thing. 
And then FHA came back in -- or FDA came back in and 
said that they had the power to cease all production if just 
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one product had any kind of contamination. At which point they 
did. They -- so we had to stop producing the product. They 
did not close us down though. 
Q. Okay. Didn't they seize a lot of product? 
A. The product was -- they asked for us to voluntarily 
recall the product and destroy the product. And which we did. 
Q. Well, let me ask you this. Were U.S. marshals sent 
out to seize certain things? 
A. That was done after the fact. The director of the 
FDA in Salt Lake, she said that she wanted all the product 
destroyed a certain way, a certain process, which would cost a 
lot of money. 
I said that we're going to need probably till the 
end of August in order to come up with the money. Because at 
that point not being able to sell, not being able to produce, 
not being able to function as a company till that was taken 
care of, we had to find some money. So we were looking for 
money to, to get that taken care of. Get started again. 
She got antsy. And she got a little excited. 
And --
MR. GALLEGOS: Judge, I'm going to object, Judge, to 
his characterizations of 
Q, (By Mr. Gallegos) Let me, let me just ask --
THE COURT: So state -- ask specific questions. And 
then don't, don't give us a narrative, sir. Just answer the 
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questions. 
Q. (By Mr. Gallegos) The Department of Health and 
Human Services, through the FDA. the Federal Food and Drug, 
Drug Administration, essentially -- didn't they issue an order 
to seize all the product and, and shut down the operation? 
A. Not to shut down the operation. 
Q. Not to -- so you were still allowed to produce that 
and sell it? 
A. (Inaudible.) 
MR. ARGUELLO: I'm going to object to relevance. 
Again, the focus of this trial is whether or not there were 
certain misrepresentations or omissions made to this witness by 
the Defendant. What happened in 2008 or 2009 with the FDA is 
irrelevant to the issues we have to decide. 
I've let it go for a while. but I don't see the 
relevance of this questioning. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Judge, it goes to the credibility. I 
mean, in order for the Court to make a finding, you have to 
believe Mr. Markham. And I think it's going the way he 
characterizes things. 
And the fact that he says his company closed. and 
now the way he's dancing around this, I think it certainly goes 
to the credibility that the Court needs to. to make a 
determination in the way he characterizes statements. 
THE COURT: I, I think we've allowed probably about 
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as much as I'm willing to allow. I think I know where you were 
going. I think you've got whatever it is you need to get in. 
The company was shut down, even though Mr. Markham doesn't 
characterize it that, basically shut down because the FDA 
stopped production. So. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Okay. 
THE COURT: The company can still go forward, but if 
it had no product to make and distribute, then. 
MR. GALLEGOS: So I --
THE COURT: So we're done. 
MR. GALLEGOS: I think 22 I -- 22 is entered, 
correct? 
MR. ARGUELLO: Yes, 22 is in evidence. That was a 
letter written by the Defendant to Mr. Bird. Twenty-two is in 
evidence with no objection, Judge. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Then I don't have anything further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Arguello. 
MR. ARGUELLO: Briefly, Judge. 
THE COURT: Please. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ARGUELLO: 
Q. After Lane leaves the company under the 
circumstances that you described you tried for a couple of 
years to get this company running, correct? 
A. Yes. 
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questions that relate to what happened to the company long 
after Lane is gone. Representations about whether the company 
was or wasn't making money. Was or wasn't successful. Did you 









In the -- well, first of all, how long were you 
in this company? You obviously began in 2007. When 
company actually shut down? When do you close its 
2009. 
2009? During that two-plus years of involvement was 
there any a -- was there ever a single month or quarter where 
this company made an actual profit where your assets exceeded 




You were asked a variety of questions about 
documents that are in evidence about agreements, and letters of 
intent, and all this (inaudible) going somewhere. In those 







Were you trying to make a profit? 
Yes. 
Were any of those, any of those purported agreements 
or agreements, letters of intent, did they ever ultimately get 
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consummated in actual voluminous sales of the product? Were 
you ever able to sell the product? 
A. No. 
Q. And again, just one final question on just the 
issues that you were cross-examined on. There was some 
discussion about a refinancing of the Defendant•s home at some 
point in 2005. I think refinancing of the Defendant·s home was 
how the defense characterized it. But do you remember those 
questions, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you involved in any way, shape, or form with 
that refinancing? 
A. With Lane Bird, no. 
Q. And with your knowledge (inaudible), who was? Who 
was involved in that issue with the Defendant•s home? 
As far as -- well, his, his dad and my wife. A. 
Q. Okay. And again, in the course of your work would 
it be a violation of her fiduciary duty to share information 
with you about confidential things she would or could be 
learning about the Defendant•s background; is she allowed to 
share that with you just because you•re her husband? 
A. No. 
Q. The information that you know about that particular 
transaction, is that information that simply just came to you 
in general form by your wife? 
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(August 29, 2012 - State v. Bi rd) 
over at their home for family dinners and things like that. 
Q. When you say you met them because they were Lane's 
neighbor, fair to say that you knew Lane first, and then 
through your association with Lane you met the Markhams? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Things at Clarcon got up and running, I think you 
said once the capital came in, correct? 
A. We had, we had still done business before that. And 
had done sales, prospecting, marketing, and trying to get 
things up and going. But it expedited, and grew, and expanded 
once the capital came in. 




You mentioned that during the month of -- at least 
the limited time period you were there that, again, once the 
capital came in, things were moving. I think your testimony on 
direct was that production increased while you were there after 
the capital came in. Correct? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
Q. Who were you selling to? You specifically. Who did 
you sell to? 
A. So it was preliminary. And I went to trade show. 
And I worked with organizations like Blitz USA. Save Mart. 
Q. 
A. 
How much product did Blitz USA purchase? 
We were not able to close the deal prior to their 
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So the answer to my question is zero. Correct? 
Not to those organizations. I had sold a case to 
Some representatives of SYSCO. And --
A case. How much is a case? 
Probably about 48 bottles or so. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Forty-eight bottles. How much is 48 bottles of this 
lotion worth? 
It wasn't much. A. 
Q. 
with? 
Other than SYSCO, who else did you consummate a sale 
A. Hmm. I'd have to go back and check my records, but 
I'm pretty certain there were a couple small ma-and-pa shops 
that we closed a couple of cases with. 
Q. SYSCO and a couple of small mom-and-pop situations? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative.) 
Q. Okay. Just going to show you what's in evidence --
these are documents that are in evidence. I know you haven't 
been present for the trial, but I just want to show you some 
documents. State's Exhibit 3, 4, and 5. 
Just take a look at those documents. And take 
whatever time you need. When you're done flipping through 
those, just look up. 
(Pause.) 
MR. ARGUELLO: And with your permission I'm going to 
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(August 29, 2012 - State v. Bird) 
Q. What is it? 
A. This is a monthly cash flow projection that was done 
up by Bill after he had, had reviewed -- he'd gone through all 
the records and books. What we were trying to do, he was 
trying to figure out exactly what we had, what the, what the 
numbers were, what they needed to be, in order to make 
decisions on what we need to do to turn it around so we could 
become profitable. 
Q. So I guess what I'm asking you, is this a 
spreadsheet that was given to you, or did you prepare it? 
A. Bill prepared this. 





And that was based upon what; do you know? 
That was based upon his review of the records. 
Of what records? 
A. That were there at Clarcon. The invoices. All the 
records that were available. 
Q. So did it -- was it -- that had been provided to him 
by -- I mean by you and him, or by -- I mean, who was it --
A. Everybody. 
Q. The records were provided by who? 
A. By me, by Omar, by what was in their old files from 
Clarconlabs, LLC, to determine the, the costs, and what they 
had out, and everything that they did. He put it together and 
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And so he did. He spent hours going over all the ledgers and 
everything. 
Our main thing -- the main reason that he started to 
do that, and that we -- he needed to do that is we, we started 
analyzing all the old ClarconLabs, LLC, invoices and what they 
were selling product for. Well, we started -- when we got 
there, you know, we started, Okay, how much are they 
actually -- is it costing them to make a bottle of product? 
And as Bill was figuring out all those costs, how 
much money we actually had in a bottle, he figured out that the 
old company, Omar's old company, was actually selling product 
most of the time for less money than it was costing them to 
produce. The dollars were big, but there was no profit --
Q. Okay. 
A. -- because they, they didn't know how to work that 
out. And that's the main reason that he did that, was so we 
knew where to put our prices. 
Q. Okay. And as far as, there was some testimony about 
whether there was one account or two accounts. How many 





Two? And did he have access to those? 
He had access to the Clarcon Labs and Clarcon 
Distributing. Always -- we were going to do it, we just didn't 
do it. 
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A. Everybody except me, and probably --
Q. Do you know if Omar took a paycheck? 
A. Omar did. Always had a paycheck. 
Q. And what about Bill? 
A. Once. He would always -- he was always -- it was 
always known that he would get a paycheck as soon as we could 
afford to give him a paycheck, yes. 




Eight thousand dollars a month. 
Okay. And you never got a paycheck? 
A. Never. 
Q. All right. 
MR. GALLEGOS: I don't think I have anything 
further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We're going to take a break. 
MR. ARGUELLO: Thank you. I was going to say, I 
need to run to the restroom. 
THE COURT: We'll take 15 minutes. 
MR. ARGUELLO: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Come back at five after. 
(A recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. ARGUELLO: Thank you, Judge. With the Court's 
permission. 
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evidence that's in evidence, none of the bank records --
summaries of the bank records here in evidence reflect any of 
these sales, correct? 
A. No, because we don't have any of the bank records, 
records from Clarconlabs, LLC. 
Q. So what we have is essentially we have to rely on 
your testimony, correct? 
A. Sure. 
Q. You were shown projections that I think are in 
evidence as State's Exhibit 1, correct? 
A. Yes. 










Who created those projections? 
I created these projections. 
Based on what? 
A. Projections provided me by the three individuals at 
Clarconlabs, LLC. 
Q. So that is what the company hoped to be producing, 
correct? 
A. Yes. It's what they had purchase orders to produce. 
Q. Okay. Fair to say that the company never met 
anywhere near those projections, correct? 
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A. 
Q. 
I would say that that is fair. 
Okay. Did you ever see any audited financial 
statements for any of the Clarcon businesses, sir? 
No, sir. A. 
Q. Was a financial audit ever done of the business, to 
your knowledge? 
A. Not that I'm aware of, no. 
Q. You never saw anything, got anything, or passed 
along anything to Mr. Markham that was an audited 





Flip to the second page of State's Exhibit No. 1. 
That document, again, is something that you gave to Bill 
Markham, correct? As evidence, again, that there were 
projected sales, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
I believe so, yes. 
And again, you got that from Omar, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I think you testified on direct examination you 




You had no idea whether or not those projections 
were legitimate or not legitimate, correct? 
A. Correct. 
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going to bring in those comments, Judge, in context. Because 
you were only told about two of his comments and there's a 
paragraph down below that clarifies it. 
THE COURT: I don't have anything in evidence. If 
you want to have him review it to refresh his recollection --
MR. GALLEGOS: Well --
THE COURT: and ask him some specific questions, 
I'll allow you to do that. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Well, that's what I was going to ask 
him. I don't want him to read it. 
THE COURT: Although I don't know that it's --
that's appropriate either, because it's not his work product. 
MR. ARGUELLO: Correct. And he has not said that he 
doesn't remember saying something at this point. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Okay. Well, let me, let me just ask 
him. Let me --
Q. (By Mr. Gallegos) Do you recall when you were being 
asked about the -- by the investigator about the company being 




And your response was: 
"They were a mess financially. They 
were a mess procedurally. Their 
manufacturing was. I would call it 
archaic at best." 
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And then do you recall explaining or qualifying that 
statement? 
A. Well, I just think that they could use a lot of 
help. And there·s a long way you could -- there was a, there 
was a long way you could go with that if you modernized and 
brought things up to par with how you should run a business. 
Q. Do you recall telling him: 
11 You know, at the time, I mean, they 
made it sound like it was, you know, 5 or 
20 thousand dollars." 
When you were asked by Investigator Nielsen: 11 Like, 
how far behind are they in debt? Your response was: 
Q. 
"But later on down the line when we're 
in there I learned that it was 
significantly more than that. And I 
couldn 1 t tell you what the exact numbers 
were, but it was significantly more than 
had been represented." 
MR. ARGUELLO: I'm going to object to form. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Well, I'm going to --
(By Mr. Gallegos) Do you remem --
MR. GALLEGOS: I guess, Judge, he 
THE COURT: How -- what -- I 
MR. GALLEGOS: I can ask him if he recalls saying 
that because he was asked specifically about comments he made 
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about the company. And, I mean. you know, as these transcripts 
are --
THE COURT: Let me, let me just indicate to you, I'm 
going to let it in. But based on what I've heard you say, it 
sounds to me like it's going to be more damaging to your client 
than it is -- I'd consider what you want to put in and what you 
don't. 
I'm going to allow you to put whatever you. you want 
in as it relates to this specific instance, but. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Gallegos) Well, I just, I mean, was that 
your did you explain to the investigator that once you got 
into the company and figured everything out, they're -- they 
were a lot worse off than what you had envisioned? 
A. Yeah. And that's what I addressed in my testimony. 
The fact that we figured out when you took cost per bottle, 
that they were actually selling a lot but not making any money. 
And that's what I was referring to. 
Q. Okay. And you're, you're discussing this with the 
investigator June of 2010. So this is after you've got the 
benefit of hindsight and seen everything that occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And, and then you were asked about the, the 
exhibit ... (inaudible) find it easier. 
There's Defense Exhibit 1, the -- and it's this one 
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A. No. Just the agreement for -- when you say "actual 
stock," we had not -- the certificates had not been ordered. 
Q. Okay. And was there --
A. Had not been. 
Q. Was there even any, I mean, was there a value in any 
company at that point? 
A. No, there was not. 
Q. Okay. This was an agreement that you guys, provided 





Okay. And, uh. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Judge, I think that's all the 
questions I have. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
I have a question that I'm very interested in. Sir, 
turn to State's Exhibit 9. It's the Powerslide Tools check 
register? 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Can you see there on February 20th there 
was a check to Clarconlabs for $25,000? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And also on February 22nd there was a 
check or a transfer, I'm not sure what it was exactly, but a 
transfer to Clarcon for $10,000; is that correct? 
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security, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You had business proposals that were given to 
you by Omar, Defendant's Exhibit 3, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were shown, by Omar, proof of prior sales of the 
product, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You had projections that were given to you, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were shown checks -- I think it's 
Defendant's 19, I think. You were shown multiple checks that 
represented sales 
different vendors? 
or purchases of the product, correct, by 
Yes. A. 
Q. So it's your testimony that when you get involved in 
Clarcon the company is a thriving company? 
A. I wouldn't say "thriving." It looked like it was 
doing darn good. 
Q. Doing darn good. The company was doing darn good. 
Making sales. Looked like it was making a profit, making 
money, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. You remember back on June 22nd of 2010 you went and 
had a meeting with the investigator in this case, Jeffrey 
Nielsen. Do you remember that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And you sat down. and he asked you a bunch of 




Went through everything that you could possibly 
remember about what occurred with this Clarcon venture that you 
had embarked on, correct? 
A. Yeah. We were, we were scratching the surface of an 
old, old bad memory. 
Q. You told the investigator, sir, did you not, that 
the company was a mess? 
A. Management. 
Q. Management. Just management? 
A. Yeah. They didn't know what they were doing. 
Q. They didn't know what they were doing? 
A. They didn't, they didn't know how to. how to do 
things what I would consider properly and in step for the 
business to be in a potential that they could be. It was. it 
was a mess. Accounting-wise it was a mess. 
Q. So accounting-wise it was a mess as well, correct? 
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Yeah. 
Management-wise it was a mess, correct? 
Yes. 
Accounting-wise it was a mess, correct? 
Yes. 
Financially it was a mess, wasn't it? 








Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you. Sir, isn't it true you 
told -- well, withdrawn. 
Do you remember being asked the following questions 
by Investigator Nielsen and giving the following answers: 
"Question: What kind of things were a 
mess? 
"Answer: Everything. 
"Question: When you say 'everything'? 
"Answer: They were a mess financially. 
They were a mess procedurally. Their 
manufacturing was, I would call it 
archaic at best." 
Do you remember hearing those questions and giving 
those answers? 
A. Yes. 
MR. GALLEGOS: Judge, can I just ask, he's reading, 
what page he was referring to? 
MR. ARGUELLO: Yes. I will say, Judge, this was 
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provided to the Court and Counsel prior to trial. This was a 
transcript of the interview. I was reading from page 6 of the 
transcript. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Those -- Che? Those pages are off 
a little bit from what these copies show. 
MR. ARGUELLO: And the printout I have may -- the 
pages may be a little off. If you're unable to find it when I 
refer to this, please let me know, and I'll try to find it for 
you. 
THE COURT: That's fine. I'm not sure that it's 
necessary at this particular point for me to do that, but --
MR. ARGUELLO: Correct. 
THE COURT: I will find it. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Che. 
MR. ARGUELLO: One sec. 
(Pause.) 
Q. (By Mr. Arguello) And in fact the company -- and 
when I say ''the company," at the time you get involved the 
company is Clarconlabs. LLC, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So the company, isn't it in fact true, was a 
complete mess? 
A. It was not living up to what it could be done if it 
was operated correctly. 
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Q. My question is a "yes 11 or "no" question, sir. 
You've heard -- we've heard your testimony. We've discussed 
some things you said to the investigator. Yes or no, the 
company was a complete mess? 
A. In my opinion, it was a mess. 
Q. You were going to be the company's savior, correct? 
A. I wouldn't characterize myself as a "savior," no. 
Q. Going back to that June 22nd, 2002, interview with 
Mr. Nielsen. Do you recall being asked the following question 
and giving the following answer: 
"Question: Okay. Were you offered 
some sort of role inside the company, or 
did they ask you just to work for them? 
"Answer: They wanted me, they wanted 
me to do everything for them. They 
wanted me to come in and just be their 
savior and take care of them and 
whatever. 
"And I tried again over the, you know, 
I don't know, maybe a week or two, you 
know. I looked into some things and, you 
know, checked out their stuff, you know. 
They, they wanted me to come in to be a 
partner. Do everything. 
"And I said, 'Well, I managed to become 
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